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Embodied approaches to cognitive science frequently describe the mind as “world-
involving,” indicating complementary and interdependent relationships between an agent
and its environment. The precise nature of the environment is frequently left ill-described,
however, and provides a challenge for such approaches, particularly, it is noted here, for
the enactive approach which emphasizes this complementarity in quite radical terms. This
paper argues that enactivists should work to ﬁnd common cause with a dynamic form of
ecological psychology, a theoretical perspective that provides the most explicit theory of
the psychological environment currently extant. In doing so, the intersubjective, cultural
nature of the ecology of human psychology is explored, with the challenges this poses
for both enactivist and ecological approaches outlined. The theory of behavior settings
(Barker, 1968; Schoggen, 1989) is used to present a framework for resolving some of
these challenges. Drawing these various strands together an outline of a radical embodied
account of intersubjectivity and social activity is presented.
Keywords: enactivism, ecological psychology, affordances, behavior settings, culture
IN SEARCH OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT
Many of the various ﬂavors of embodied cognitive science describe
the mind as “world involving.” Psychological activity is “situated”
or “embedded”, dependent on or highly sensitive to environmen-
tal conditions. Enactive cognitive scientists quote the philosopher
Merleau-Ponty to provide perhaps the most dramatic example of
such thinking:
The world is inseparable from the subject, but from a subject which is
nothing but a project of the world, and the subject is inseparable from the
world, but from a world which the subject itself projects.
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 430)
Given such a view, understanding the mind requires an account
of the psychological environment as detailed and comprehensive
as our accounts of the cognitive system. I believe that enactivists
have yet to provide such an account.
In order to address this issue, in this paper I will advocate for a
closer alliance between enactive thinking and ecological psychol-
ogy as it has developed from the work of James J. Gibson. In doing
so I endorse a similar call by Chemero (2009), and explore some
of the ways in which these two approaches can be brought closer
together to the beneﬁt of both.
Primarily, I will argue that drawing on the theoretical resources
of ecological psychology offers signiﬁcant beneﬁts for an enac-
tive cognitive science, though I will also note where I consider
enactivism has something to offer ecological psychology. Further,
following arguments that all of human psychology in particular is
embeddednot only in a physical but a social and cultural surround,
I outline how a combined approach enables a comprehensive
account of the human psychological environment.
In the following sections I will outline ﬁrst the extant enactive
thinking on the psychological environment and the core tenets of
the related but distinct ecological perspective. I will then exam-
ine the revisions of traditional ecological thinking that Chemero
(2009) uses to bring these two approaches into closer alignment
and suggest some resolutions to remaining tensions. With this
groundwork laid I turn to the question of sociality and the shared
environment. Following the work of Heft (2007, 2011), I suggest
that the concept of behavior settings advanced by Barker (1968)
and others can be used to understand social activity and suggest
this as an example of the kinds of theoretical resources that an
ecological psychology can provide for enactive thinking. I argue
that an understanding of behavior settings, encapsulated within a
radical embodied framework, can form a sound basis for a science
of embodied intersubjectivity.
WHAT IS AN ENVIRONMENT BROUGHT FORTH BY
ENACTION?
The enactive approach posits a fundamental complementarity
between the agent and its environment. As the quotation from
Merleau-Ponty makes clear, the two are seen as deeply interde-
pendent. Enactivists describe agents and their environments as
arising together, emergent phenomena (Varela et al., 1991; Weber
and Varela, 2002; Thompson, 2007). For enactivists, it all begins
with an autonomous, organisationally closed, system (see Varela,
1979). Such systems are made of a set of processes where each
process depends on at least one other component and supports
at least one other. Once such a system arises in the world the
system operates so as to implicitly make a distinction between
things (processes) that are part of that system and those that
are not. The system, the most basic form of agency whose only
purpose can be seen as continuing to produce itself (Weber and
Varela, 2002; Thompson and Stapleton, 2009), will be struc-
turally coupled to the world around it. Richer, more complex
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systems have richer, more complex potential interactions (Di
Paolo, 2005; Barandiaran et al., 2009). Some aspects of the world
are relevant to the agent’s concerns and body, and can affect it
in various ways, whereas there are large portions of the world
that are effectively absent or non-existent for the agent. The envi-
ronment, then, is the world standing in various relations to the
agent, relations that hold because of the agent’s values, needs,
capabilities and embodiment. As a relational phenomenon the
environment emerges with the agent, the two are a complemen-
tary pair and neither can be fully speciﬁed without reference to the
other.
Thinking in such terms means that encounters between an
agent and its environment are normally achievements of the agent
rather than impositions upon it. The world does not stimulate
a passive agent, but rather the agent engages with its surround;
interaction is sought. Psychology is, by these lights, not a process
of stimulus and response. There is no starting point for an organ-
ism’s actions (a trigger stimulus to a patient organism) because
they are already alive, already acting, already concerned. Simply
being alive means that an agent is coordinating its own activity
with that of its environment. Enactivists term this process sense-
making. An event, process, or object in the world only exists for
the agent insofar as it affects and can be brought into coordination
with the agent’s own on-going activity – it is the world made sense
of by the organism. A classic illustration of this kind of coordina-
tion often used in the enactive literature is that of a bacterium’s
climbing of a sucrose gradient (Varela, 1991).
The Escherichia coli bacterium has two modes of locomotion:
one characterized by random tumbling, the other by coherent
movement in a given direction. The chemical sucrose can inter-
act with the bacterium’s cell membrane and can be metabolized
by the cell. As such, an E. coli can encounter sucrose, and what
is more, tends to encounter it as food. When a tumbling bac-
terium encounters sucrose it tends to switch to a more coherent
movement that brings it toward areas of higher concentration
of food. This illustration outlines the mutual character of the
agent and its environment – the sucrose can only be present
for the organism because the organism’s embodiment enables it.
The agent simply cannot engage with many other aspects of the
world (e.g., tectonic movements, most variations in the electro-
magnetic spectrum, most variations in atmospheric pressure).
The example also makes the point that engagements between
an agent and the environment involve the coordination of the
agent’s needs or values (in this case the need of continued mate-
rial self-production to which sucrose can contribute, serving
the value of continued existence) with the resources, opportu-
nities, threats, and demands of an environment that matters
to it.
The enactive description of psychology ﬁts very closely with
the notions of Dewey (1896) set forth in his classic paper “The
reﬂex arc concept in Psychology.” Dewey argues that a “response”
is never “triggered” by a “stimulus” because the stimulus is always
encountered in the process of the agent’s on-going behavior.
Rather than consider stimuli and responses we are better con-
sidering tensions that arise in the organism’s encounters that
are resolved by coordinations. Psychology is not a process that
occurs in the space between stimulus and response but in the
engagement between an agent and its environment. It is a rela-
tional phenomenon that must be addressed in relational terms
that acknowledge both aspects of the tensions and coordinations
in question.
Many of the illustrations of the world-involving nature of cog-
nitive activity by enactive researchers deal in rather fundamental
biological terms, such as the chemical processes in living cells
(Varela, 1991) or minimalist computational robotics models that
illustrate proofs of concept (Di Paolo, 2003; Di Paolo et al., 2010;
Egbert and Barandiaran, 2014; Egbert and Cañamero, 2014). The
characterisation of the relationship between the agent and the
world in stark physical, chemical, or dynamical terms of bodily
processes coupled to environmental ones makes some important
points. The environment does not stand outside of the agent,
imposing stimuli upon it in tit-for-tat exchanges of trigger and
movement. It remains something of an open task for enactivists,
however, to characterize the psychological environment in terms
that ﬁt both the enactive attitude – acknowledging the relational,
co-determined nature of the environment and psychological activ-
ity – as well as experience and activities more personally familiar
to us human beings.
THE ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
Perhaps the most clearly and systematically developed account
of the psychological environment available is that of the ecolog-
ical psychology that traces back to the perceptual psychologist
Gibson (1966, 1986). Much like the enactivists who would come
later, Gibson described a complementarity between the organism
and its environment. He notes that the organism’s environment is
not deﬁned by the kinds of purely objective measures of Physics,
but rather in terms relative to the agent – ecological terms. When
being introduced to someone you do not stand, say, 80 cm from
them, you stand within arm’s reach to shake their hand. The psy-
chological environment, then, should be described relative to the
psychological agent who is engaged with it.
On ﬁrst blush it might seem that this way of thinking could
lead us very quickly into an unwanted solipsism, with each organ-
ism living in its own distinct environment. Gibson (1986, p. 43)
resolves this concern with a single clear and seemingly obvious
point. Perceivers move. While no observers can occupy precisely
the same point of view at the same time, the environment they
share can be moved around and explored. The same perspec-
tive can be taken by different observers at different times. The
environment remains to be explored by all of the observers that
share it over the duration of its existence. An environment is
shared inasmuch as two agents can perceive and act on it in a
similar manner, something that will be the case for almost all ani-
mals of the same species and indeed many animals of different
species.
Understanding the psychological environment as described by
ecological psychology, then, involves understanding the relation-
ship between an animal and its ecological niche – those aspects
of the physical world that are relevant to the animal’s needs and
capabilities and within which the animal will spend its life. This
relationship between need, capability and the world around the
organism brings out perhaps the most famous of concepts that
Gibson put forward – affordances.
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The affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, what it
provides or furnishes, either for good or ill...It implies the complementarity
of the animal and the environment.
(Gibson, 1986, p. 127)
For us humans, for instance, ﬂat ground generally affords walk-
ing on, while a cup affords grasping. The surface of water affords
walking on by a pond-skater but not for us. Affordances are oppor-
tunities, allowing an animal to ﬁt their actions to the world around
them, or obstacles, demanding effective actions to be overcome.
Within the ecological literature affordances are commonly seen
as properties of the environment. While they might be animal rel-
ative (such as the affordance of a pond surface for walking) they
remain proper to the environment. Reed (1996a) takes quite a
strong stance on this position, holding affordances as being prop-
erties of the world ready to be engaged with by any animal and
which can impose selection pressures on species over evolutionary
timescales. A more standard mode of thinking on the issue sees
affordances as dispositional properties, properties of the world
that can be instantiated just in those instances where an animal
with the appropriate capacity interacts with it. This perspective
is particularly associated with Michael Turvey, Robert Shaw and
William Mace (Turvey et al., 1981; see also Turvey, 1992).
From an ecological perspective perception is generally percep-
tion of affordances. We perceive our environment in terms of what
it affords. Crucially this perception is direct – it needs no repre-
sentations, computations or other“mental gymnastics”(Chemero,
2009). Direct perception is to a large extent a matter of successful
coordination of our behavior with some relevant variable in the
environment. Rather than the creation of a perceptual image, the
activation of some encodedmemory or the production of amental
model, perception is the ability to engage with the environment.
Acting and perceiving take place in a medium. For us land-
living types that medium is generally the air, which is transparent
and diffuse so as to allow light, sound and solid objects to move
through it readily. In the case of vision, light, which typically
suffuses the entire domain in which we are behaving, will move
(reﬂect, bounce around) in a reliablemanner that is given structure
by the shape and texture of objects in the vicinity. By moving
our eyes we can use the structure of the light to coordinate our
movements with the objects, surfaces, and other things in our
environment. The world is perceived directly via these structures
in the ambient array of energy (light or sound, for instance) and
chemistry (in the case of smells) rather than interpreted through
the construction of representations or models.
This structure in light (or sound or other energy and chemical
arrays around us) Gibson referred to as “ecological information.”
Quite different to how information is commonly discussed inCog-
nitive Science, it is structure in ambient energy that is formed due
to the structure of the environment.
A classic example of ecological information is how the dynam-
ics of optical ﬂow specify and thereby allow us to perceive, time to
impact as we move toward something (Lee, 1974). As we approach
an object elements of its visual texture tend to spread apart in our
visual ﬁeld. The rate at which this happens has a direct relationship
with how long we have until we hit the object in question (if it’s in
the middle of our visual ﬁeld and stays there). This information is
present not in the form of some encoding but in the relationship
between movement and structure in the ambient light. It is a rel-
atively simple affair (which is to say that it requires no “mental
gymnastics” nor a cognitive system capable of same) for an ani-
mal to guide various movement-based behaviors according to this
easily sampled relationship. No representation of the actual time
to impact is required because that can be perceived directly via the
optic-ﬂow variable in question.
Ecological information is not“taken in”or processed with some
model (however, sparse or rich) of the environment. Rather, an
animal is able to attune to it, to use it as a means of coordinating its
behavior with the environment. The psychological environment is
the set of affordances that exists for the agent. Ecological informa-
tion is the means by which an animal perceives those affordances.
Perceiving occurs not as a passive reception of stimuli but as an
active part of perception-action cycles, coordinations between the
agent and its environment.
Gibson thus shares with enactivists (and, indeed, Dewey) the
notion that in perception the agent is already acting. Actions are
coordinations with the environment, not responses to it. While
the enactive and the ecological clearly have much in common,
however, there are a few considerations that stall any straight-
forward adoption by enactivists of an ecological account of the
environment.
A DYNAMIC RECONCILIATION OF ENACTIVE AND
ECOLOGICAL ACCOUNTS, CHEMERO’S “RADICAL EMBODIED
COGNITIVE SCIENCE”
In The Embodied Mind, Varela et al. (1991, pp. 203–204) explic-
itly oppose their enactive view to Gibson’s ecological one. They
take issue with a seemingly ﬁxed conception of affordances put
forward by Gibson, arguing that such an approach does not ade-
quately acknowledge the dynamic interdependence between the
agent and its environment. They quote Gibson (1972, p. 239) as
understanding affordances, and the ecological information that
speciﬁes them, as “there to be discovered.”
The ontological priority here of not just the world but the envi-
ronment (the perspectival, relational, description of the world) is
a form of philosophical realism that runs counter to the emergen-
tist views of enactivists. A more observer-relative description of
affordances put forward by Turvey, Shaw, Reed and Mace (Turvey
et al., 1981; see also Turvey, 1992) is somewhat less objection-
able (Varela et al., 1991). However, the idea that the world for the
agent is exhaustively speciﬁed at any given moment by ecologi-
cal information, thus leaving much of the texture and detail of the
agent unnecessary in a description of a given engagement, remains
counter to an enactive stance. Similarly, a proper explanation of
the perception of (visual) affordances will require more than just
an account of optics, however, ecologically speciﬁed (Varela et al.,
1991).
Over several decades of ecological research, however, there has
been a long-standing debate as to just how affordances should best
be conceived and how their relationship with the agent should be
understood (Heft, 1989; Turvey,1992; Chemero,2003,2009; Jones,
2003; Michaels, 2003; Stoffregen, 2003; Withagen and Chemero,
2012; Withagen et al., 2012).
Recently, Chemero (2009), in reﬁning our understanding of
affordances, has explicitly sought to reconcile the ecological and
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enactive viewpoints under a banner of “radical embodied cogni-
tive science.” In order to do this, Chemero has argued a number
of points.
Firstly, he redoubles the emphasis on dynamic interaction
with the environment that is part and parcel of an ecological
approach. Chemero notes that while ecological psychologists have
adopted dynamical thinking and the methods of dynamical sys-
tems science in a deep and thorough-going manner over the past
decades, the orthodox conception of affordances (that associated
with Turvey et al., 1981) does not show quite the same dynamic
sensibility.
Now, affordances have always been dynamical concepts. A ﬂy-
ing ballmight afford catching, but onlywhile in ﬂight. A stationary
or slow-moving cup affords grasping, but not one moving too
quickly. But many affordances are sufﬁciently stable such that they
are often discussed simply as properties of the object in question –
the ﬂat rigid surface of the ground affords walking on, for instance.
However, even something so basic as the rigidity required forwalk-
ing on need only remain long enough for me to perform the action
in question. Non-Newtonian dilatant ﬂuids, for example, such as
a suspension of starch in water, can afford walking despite the
rigidity only lasting as long as the impact of a person’s foot with
its surface (Custard, 2014).
Affordances are dynamic things whose presence describes an
opportunity for effective action, a possibility of coordination. In
being such they say as much about the agent acting as they do
the environment with which they are engaged. Chemero (2009, p.
140) follows Michaels (2000), who argued that an affordance to
punch a falling ball is perceived as “it’s time to ﬂex the elbow.” By
this view, affordances are not properties of the environment. They
are, rather, relations that hold between an agent and their envi-
ronment. In making this claim Chemero removes a signiﬁcant
point of disagreement between ecological and enactive thinking
and asserts a relational description of the psychological envi-
ronment. Chemero is still a realist about affordances, because
affordances really do exist, but it is, as he put it “not a sim-
ple form of realism” (Chemero, 2009, p. 150). It is a realism
that seems quite consistent with the emergentist commitments
of enactivism.
Chemero also addresses considerations about how an organism
might perceive affordances. The orthodoxTurvey et al. (1981) view
on the matter requires a strict one-to-one relationship between
the ecological information (e.g., structure in the ambient array of
light) and the affordance that it speciﬁes. These must be lawfully
related (even if the laws in question are speciﬁc to an ecological-
niche). Chemero (2009) uses the situational semantics of Barwise
and Perry (1981) to dilute the lawfulness requirement. Like the
philosopher Millikan (2000), he argues that the relationship need
not be exception-free, it just needs to be sufﬁciently reliable to
guide behavior effectively under normal circumstances, and, we
might imagine, within normally recoverable bounds of likely
perturbation or failure. This move offers some ﬂexibility in the
relationship between the agent and their environment that under-
mines the kind of objectivist pre-speciﬁcation of relationships that
Varela et al. (1991) considered counter to the enactivist emphasis
on the role of the speciﬁc embodied agent with its own history of
coupling with the world.
This perspective, more sensitive to individual histories and
dynamics, is also present in Chemero’s view as he argues for
another dynamic aspect to affordances – the gradual transforma-
tion of affordance relations over various timescales. Traditional
thinking on affordances links them to the organism’s ecological
niche, noting that over evolutionary time aspects of the environ-
ment become available for use by members of a species. Chemero
points out that this also happens at a personal level over devel-
opmental time. It involves, in a sense, the construction of an
individual, personal eco-niche, as a person develops certain skills
or abilities and learns to engagewith their environment in different
ways.
Chemero (2009) refers to this niche for the individual organ-
ism as the phenomenological-cognitive-behaivoral niche of the
particular animal. It is a concept intended to enable a more
ﬁne-grained analysis of the animal environment system. Rather
than examining the effect of populations of animals on their
shared environment, the focus is on the peculiarities of a sin-
gle agent’s effect on the world around it. This will include the
agent’s continually increasing sensitivity to the speciﬁc, partic-
ular details of that world, that give rise to a unique perspective.
Such phenomenological-cognitive-behavioral nicheswill certainly
be largely shared between animals with similar capacities, but will
differ insofar as the particular histories and capabilities of those
animals differ.
This ﬁtting of the agent with its environment over time is
achieved through another relation that holds between the two,
one that is complementary to the affordance relation. Chemero
(2009) describes abilities as relations that mediate changes in the
animal (Chemero emphasizes the nervous system, but there is no
a priori reason to limit the scope to that) that enable the organism
to become sensitive to affordances.
In his outlining of the notion of abilities and the timescale
over which they change Chemero focuses primarily on develop-
mental time, the kinds of periods over which we learn new skills
and gradually change what we are capable of. These changes tend
to occur over much shorter timescales too, though. Central to
enactive theorizing is the notion that the agent-enviornment sys-
tem is valenced, normative. Enactivists, to a much greater degree
than mainstream ecological thinking, emphasize the impor-
tance of motivation and intentions. In addition to more stable
species-typical capabilities and even individually tuned skills, the
immediate ﬁeld of action of an agent will depend on the ﬂow of it
needs and intends at a given time.
THE ENGAGEMENT: THE FIELD OF ACTION OF INTENTIONAL AGENTS
In a brief paper that provides an overview of enactivist psychol-
ogy, McGann et al. (2013) claim that enaction begins with an
engagement – a particular encounter between an agent and their
environment. For enactivists psychology is to be found in the
entire animal-environment system, and ecological psychologists
hold to the same idea. Both points of view ﬁnd an agent already
dealing with being alive, already interacting with its environment,
rather than waiting in passivity and darkness for stimulation. The
ecological perspective (and Chemero’s revision of it still shares this
characteristic) examines how the process of the interactionunfolds
or develops over time, the dynamics of the sensorimotor processes.
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Enactivists have a similar interest, but also explore the various
ways in which the biological dynamics of the living agent motivate
or drive (and constrain) those sensorimotor processes (McGann,
2007; Di Paolo et al., 2010; Barandiaran andEgbert, 2013; McGann
et al., 2013). Though substantial work remains to be done on this
issue, particularly in “scaling up” to the complexities of human
psychology, enactive theory makes salient considerations of inten-
tionality (that is the formation and dynamics of intentions to
act) about which ecological theorists have had comparatively little
to say.
A notable exception on this front is the intentional theory of
affordances advanced by Heft (1989). In an account that I believe
is largely consistent with Chemero’s, Heft argues that in order to
understand affordances we must not only describe them relative to
the body of the agent, but to that body in the process of intentional
activity. This provides a much more dynamic and relational con-
ception of affordances than the ecological psychology orthodoxy.
As motivations wax and wan the relevance of different abilities
varies and the engagement between agent and environment varies
accordingly. Heft (1989) notes that intentions must themselves be
considered in world-involving, relational, terms – these are not
mentalistic representations after all – and to leave them out of the
description of the agent’s relations with its surround is a mistake.
Chemero’s description of abilities has no prominent role for
these intentional, motivational aspects of the agent’s activity, but
no description of an engagement, an animal-environment sys-
tem, can be complete without them. Along with the driven,
valued, normative character of the engagement, they also high-
light the short-timescale dynamics of abilities and affordances,
which will arise and dissolve as relations as the agent ﬁnds its
values challenged or facilitated, in conﬂict or coordination, in
interaction with its environment. We might describe the general
ecological niche of a given species, and even a particular animal’s
phenomenological-cognitive-behavioral niche, but animals don’t
interact with generalities. These broader descriptions of an envi-
ronment provide progressively higher resolution explanations for
an animal’s behavior. Understanding the ﬁner-grained details of
an organism’s activity on a given occasion will need to include the
kind of fast-moving intentional dynamics that are involved in the
engagement in question.
The engagement, the ﬁeld of action of an agent, is deﬁned
by a complement of ability/affordance relations, with the pro-
viso that these relations have a normative, intentional aspect.
These relations have value. Sense-making was described above
as the process of an organism being sensitive to and inte-
grating the world into its own activity (at the very base, the
activity of continually producing itself, staying alive). Insofar
as something in the world plays a role (is an opportunity or
threat of some kind) in the agent’s normative activity, the agent
can make sense of it through the coordination of its behavior
with the event, process, or object in question. Motivations and
intentions are how we describe these normative aspects of an
agent-environment system, and so sense-making is effectively a
process of the coordination of an agent’s values and intentions
with its environment.
Of course things get a little more tricky when there’s more than
one agent in that environment.
SHARED FIELDS OF ACTION
Where more than one agent is involved in a situation then the
engagement is not just the coordination of one set of values or
intentions with the environment, but a set of complex interactions
between the various agents and their shared environment. Where
the meaning or sense-making in the individual case is in the con-
gruence between abilities and affordances that hold between agent
and environment, in the social case there will be a set of relations
that are negotiated between the agents. Whether another agent
is an obstacle or resource, impediment, or aid to a given agent’s
intentions is often malleable, due to the adaptive responsiveness
of both agents to each other.
The variability of agentive action is in theory a signiﬁcant
challenge for an ecological approach to understanding the envi-
ronment. The range and variability of animals’ behavior could be
thought to undermine the reliable relationship between structure
of ambient energy at any time and the animal’s activity. During
any given period it is conceivable that the same person might
engage in any one of numerous possible behaviors, some of which
will share postures, gestures, or other physical attributes that give
rise to structure in, for example, ambient light. Social interac-
tion seems to our intuitions to be so pregnant with possibility that
effective interpersonal engagement cannot be accounted for by the
kind of direct, ecological mode of description I have been advo-
cating here. Even allowing for Chemero’s somewhat less stringent
relationship between environmental structure and perceived event
there seems to be a want of reliability when dealing with other
people, given just how diverse a single individual’s repertoire of
behavior can be.
Of course this is a straw man of variability, because human
behavior is rarely if ever that arbitrary or unpredictable. The ques-
tion arises though, as to what provides the stability that human
activity tends to have and how it channelises behavior such that
the logically conceivable problem rarely ever arises in practice.
Heft (2007) has argued that a completely realized ecological
psychology will in fact be social to its core. He claims that social
activity is a fundamental part of the fabric of human psychology
and must be a fundamental part of a complete ecological psychol-
ogy. Drawing on paleoanthropology he notes that sociality is not
just part of our evolutionary heritage, but part of our evolutionary
history. Homo sapiens evolved in culture, not the other way around
(Heft, 2007; see also Donald, 1991, 2001a,b and Tomasello, 1999a
for related arguments). The mutual inﬂuence between animal and
environment over time is a central tenet of ecological psychology –
the organism’s ecological niche makes demands of and shapes the
behavior of the organism, and in turn the organism over time
affects the niche. Throughout the process of development, then,
our behavior formswithin and is shaped by our culture. Two facets
of this process can be quickly identiﬁed.
The ﬁrst facet is the process of behavior shaping that Merlin
Donald has termed “deep enculturation” (Donald, 2001a). The
idea is that during development a complex of standard ways
of doing things is formed through which more intricate coor-
dinations with our native culture are enabled. The ecological
psychologist Reed (1993) put forward a distinct but related idea
in what he terms the “ﬁeld of promoted action.” Societies tend
to evoke some behaviors more than others and in doing so shape
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the habits and capabilities of their members over the course of
development. This of course has the effect of stabilizing behaviors,
constraining the innumerable (or at least very numerous) possi-
ble activities in which a person might engage within some reliable
range.
One of the principle means by which the ﬁeld of promoted
action is produced is the careful design and structuring of the
physical environment (Reed,1996b). This cultivation and curation
of the environment in which we behave is the second facet of
development that makes social interaction more reliable.
Gibson (1986) discusses the notion of places. Places are areas of
the environment with a set of functional properties – they enable
affordances for various speciﬁc activities. Over evolutionary, his-
torical, anddevelopmental time thephysical environment has been
nurtured to given ends, and distinctions between places sharp-
ened. Muchof our social activity, our shared and inter-coordinated
behavior, is conducted in physical environments that support it.
Examining this interdependence of the social and physical in some
depth, Heft (2001, 2007, 2011) has shone a particular spotlight
on the theory of behavior settings developed by Barker (1968)
and Schoggen (1989). Developed independently of Gibson’s work,
Heft has nevertheless argued that the theory of behavior settings
is a effectively a theory of Gibson’s “places.”
BEHAVIOR SETTINGS AS A THEORY OF PLACES
A behavior setting involves a cohesive set of standing patterns
of behavior and those patterns’ physical surroundings (Barker,
1968). Easily overlooked and underestimated because of their near
omnipresence in our lives we can nevertheless recognize examples
of setting kinds immediately – a soccer game, a mathematics les-
son, a religious service, a conference talk. They involve a set of
physical resources, which often provide a spatial boundary to the
setting (e.g., the walls of a classroom or church) as well as structur-
ing the behavior of those within (perhaps with so blunt a means
as a rigid arrangement of furniture). They also tend to have quite
clear temporal boundaries. Speciﬁc instances of a behavior setting
will form, evolve and dissolve at given times, often explicitly stated
(e.g., a Wednesday, 10.30–11.10 mathematics lesson in classroom
B6). Probably a majority of our lives is spent in different behavior
settings (Heft, 2007).
In Barker’s (1968) original work examining the natural ﬂow of
behavior of residents in a small town, he and his ﬁeld team found
that the differences between the behavior of individuals tended to
be greater within a person between settings than between people
within settings. They also found that settings were just as powerful,
if not more so, than identiﬁed antecedent stimuli in predicting the
behavior of a person in their natural environment.
The theory of behavior settings is a rich and detailed one,
whose apparent power unfortunately seems matched by its obscu-
rity (Scott, 2005). For our present purposes it serves as a means
for illustrating how cultural practices are enmeshed with physical
surroundings and how the stability of physical environments is
used to help stabilize social interactions.
With behavior settings in mind we can conceptualize deep
enculturation as a process of learning how to engage with and
make use of resources in our environment that are shaped and
made available by a history of cultural practice. Enculturation is
the cultivation of abilities to use socially provided and promoted
resources, opportunities for shared and sanctioned actions.
Heft (2001) argues that the physical settings (Barker uses the
unfortunate term “synomorphs”) which are complementary or
similar in structure to the behaviors they support (they are “syn-
omorphic”to the behavior) can be considered affordances for joint
action. Many of the places in which we spend our lives are selected
and designed to support the coordination of multiple people in
some activity. More, the character of the physical environment
and the inertia of encultured habits can lead settings to coerce the
behavior of their inhabitants. Heft (2001) puts it as follows:
The relation between milieu and behavior is not contingent. It is not
the case that because this room worked well as a classroom on previous
occasions that it can be used for that purpose again. Rather it worked well
on previous occasions (or not) because of its structure or form.
Because the meaning of the setting resides in the congruence between
behavior and milieu, this relational structure has the potential to bring
actions of individuals entering the setting in line with its functional
character.
(Heft, 2001, p. 288)
Enculturation, through the promotion of certain patterns of
behavior, substantially reduces the kind of variability in behavior
that might be conceived as challenging a radical embodied (enac-
tive, ecological) account of social interaction. Our subjectivity is at
any time constrained by our shared environment, shared histories
and shared abilities or habits.
This capacity for cultural background and social activity to
constrain and shape our behavior brings into focus a ﬁnal compli-
cation, a quirk of social dynamics that has seen some signiﬁcant
discussion over the past few years within enactivist thinking: the
autonomy of the social.
SITUATED PARTICIPATION: BEING DEEPLY ENGAGED WITH OTHERS
De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007) noted that there are occasions
when a social interaction can be more than the sum of its parts –
situations in which the interaction takes on something of a life
of its own. These situations, in which the participants together
ﬁnd themselves coordinating with each other perhaps despite their
individual intentions, or coordinating with their environment in
a manner not possible for either individually, are examples of
“participatory sense-making.”
An important aspect of participatory sense-making is that the
social dynamic is emergent. The social interaction is not merely
a combination or aggregate of the behavior of its participants
but is autonomous, it has a dynamic of its own that can con-
strain the behavior of the interactants just as much as facilitate it.
The autonomous organization of the social dynamic provides it
an inertia, making the interaction resistant to perturbation, per-
haps even by the individuals enacting it. Whenever we have found
ourselves in a conversation we couldn’t get out of (when both
participants want it to stop), or felt an interaction drawn on an
unwanted trajectory despite the efforts of both parties to prevent it,
we are experiencing the autonomy of that interaction. An example
used byDe Jaegher andDi Paolo (2007) is that of two people trying
to pass one another in a narrow corridor and being brieﬂy unable
to do so because of the way their behavior becomes coordinated –
a brief back-and-forth “dance.”
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For our present purposes what we take away from the idea
of participatory sense-making is an admonition that engagement
with a social situation is constrained not only by the abil-
ity/affordance relations of the participants but also by the inherent
dynamics of the interaction itself. This over-riding dynamic,
whether due to our culturally inherited resources, the inertia of
habitual practice or our tendency to synchronize the rhythms of
our actions with the environment (and the behaviors of others),
can impose tensions and create perturbations in an agent’s activi-
ties asmuch as theymight enable or facilitate them(De Jaegher and
Froese, 2009). In situations of participatory sense-making we will
need to describe the shared engagement in terms that are more
than the aggregate of the individual engagements that comprise
them.
Participatory sense-making as it is currently theorized is an
important phenomenon that occurs in some but not all social
interactions. If the actions of individuals are explained by the evo-
lution of the agent-environment systems in question, the arising
of tensions and coordinations between the two, there will be some
circumstances in which the explanation of the actions of two or
more interacting agents might produce a remainder – where their
actions were in fact more than the sum of their parts, where the
group of agents together were a single entity engaged with their
environment rather than an aggregate of individuals. Behavior
settings and the notion of places remind us that participatory
sense-making will not occur in a vacuum but often in a culti-
vated physical milieu. These concepts offer a ﬁrst pass theoretical
account of how such over-arching dynamics can arise and can have
functional effects. Barker (1968) and his colleagues have explored
some of the ways in which settings coerce behavior, examining
optimally- and under-inhabited settings and the different ways in
which people respond to the requirements of a given place. These
have also beenput to somepractical use in, for example, promoting
inclusiveness in school-aged children (Fuhrer, 1993). A sensitivity
to the broader context of a given activity offers some possible value
in predicting when participatory sense-making is likely to occur,
and what the course of its dynamic over time is likely to be.
Participatory sense-making reminds us that social activity is
not just more activity, but is different in kind from interaction
with the inanimate environment. However, the ideas of behavior
settings and the acknowledgment of the socially curated, designed
nature of most of the places in which human activity takes place
equally remind us that participatory sense-making and the other
complexities of social interaction are both supported and con-
strained by a host of observable and investigable factors. Recent
work by Froese et al. (2014) is an example of how the dynamics of
social interaction have been examined explicitly in these terms in
a minimalist virtual environment. The theory of behavior settings
offers a means of analyzing environments to explore the issue in
more naturalistic contexts.
RADICAL EMBODIED INTERSUBJECTIVITY
As has already been noted, a radical embodied approach that com-
bines enactive and ecological thinking sees perception and action
as occurring within an already ﬂowing stream of activity. A living
agent is never entirely at rest (even sleep is an activity). Such a
view thus adopts a Deweyan notion of tensions and coordinations
of behavior in context. When we are considering human beings
the dynamics of tensions and coordinations are shaped by the
practices and places of the surrounding culture.
Traditional, computational, or cognitivist models of psychol-
ogy begin with a bare, decontextualized psychological system and
layer context in the form of interpretations or biased represen-
tations over what are imagined as at least potentially faithful
encodings of an external environment. For the view advanced
here perceiving is done within the ﬂow of behavior and so objects
or actions of others show up in that ﬂow, are engaged with as con-
cordant or discordant with it. Interpretation doesn’t come after
the fact, culturally formed cognitive activity is not an add-on
or appendix to normal cognitive activity. Because in the human
case abilities, habits, and practices are cultivated according to
cultural norms from our earliest experiences, our culture does
not introduce bias or add skew to our behavior, but inheres
in the very basic forms of our activity from the get-go. Our
acting and perceiving is done in cultural settings – in places –
and our abilities (and their complementary affordances) develop
accordingly.
Tomasello (1999a,b) has argued a similar point. He criticizes
Gibsonian researchers for overlooking the cultural context in
which objects are ﬁrst encountered and the manner in which this
affects people’s sensitivity to those objects’ affordances. He sug-
gests the idea of “intentional affordances,” which are the normal
functions to which objects are put and will be primary for that
object in the ﬁeld of promoted action. Here, I point out that this
mode of thought generalizes to the social activity itself.
Just as perceiving and acting occurs within an on-going ﬂow of
activity, so people and their behavior are always present within a
ﬂow of cultural practice. We cannot identify and examine perceiv-
ing and acting separately to the context in which they show up,
but must analyze them within the engagement between the agent
and the environment. Similarly, we cannot pick out the individual
cognitive processes or actions separately from their cultural con-
text and attempt to understand the whole as the sum of its parts.
A radical embodied approach requires us to always address phe-
nomena as occurring as wholes, with parts existing insofar as they
stand in various relations within that identiﬁed system. In the case
of psychology, parts arise from wholes, rather than the other way
around.
This approach imposes some challenges on us as investigators.
A cognitive science must specify the context of its observations at
all times, making explicit the situation in which the processes of
interest are arising. While there may be ways in which aspects of
context can be held steady across observations and even experi-
ments, we can never leave implicit the particular dynamics of the
setting in which behavior is emerging and ﬂowing.
A radical embodied understanding of both individual and joint
activity places that activity out in public – in the observable inter-
action. Intentions, actions, emotions and other phenomena are
not locked away in the heads of participants, needing a series
of inferences to identify them. We perceive these things directly
insofar as we can coordinate effectively with them, whether that
activity involves scientiﬁc observation or just personal interaction.
To that extent, science is a direct extension of the personal activ-
ity of making sense of things (and in fact, is a contextualizing
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support for sense-making for those of us who are practicing
scientists).
An understanding of intersubjectivity is approached from pre-
cisely the same perspective, seeing the individuals show up within
the engagement rather than seeing the engagement as the lin-
ear sum of the actions and interpretations of rigidly speciﬁed
individuals as they meet.
There is, thus, a sense in which you are a different person
in different interactions, but the stability of your bodily dynam-
ics and the inertia of your habitual behaviors, cultivated over
time, within cultural contexts, means that you are not created
anew, without history every time. The identity of individuals
within interactions varies between situations but neither arbi-
trarily nor entirely unpredictably. Your role in a behavior setting
will shape your behavior, as will your personal history of expe-
rience with such settings, and such roles. Many interactions
will enable multiple social roles to be played and their associ-
ated skills exercised, other roles will be suppressed, or starved of
opportunities.
Interacting with my undergraduate students, for instance, it is
demanded of me that I play a didactic role and deploy a particular
complex of skills in doing so. There is also occasional possibility
for indulging in a little philosophical speculation but little if any
possibility or likelihood in passing a soccer ball or debating the
merits of a science ﬁction novel. A classroom setting can make
certain demands on my because of my history and skillset – it
makes different demands on my students.
Emergent interpersonal engagements are not fully autonomous
from their enabling conditions – they still occur between embod-
ied agents who are coupled to their environments (including each
other) through various sensorimotor abilities. The utterance of
a promise, a protestation of love or a glint in the eye still pro-
duce structure in the ambient energy of the living medium with
which attuned agents can coordinate their actions. Though there
is an important sense in which it is autonomous and the social
domain has a dependence on recent history of the individuals’
interaction that the inanimate world does not – the same structure
in the ambient array provides ecological information (supports
effective coordination of action) under one history but not under
another.What ismore, because the relation is continually evolving,
being negotiated, based on the actions of the agents involved some
affordances for joint action will only arise when other aspects of
behavior have been effectively entrained and the two are involved
in participatory sense-making.
Attempting to reduce participatory sense-making to the actions
of individual participants is doomed to failure, but the auton-
omy of social practice is still conducted by embodied agents in
physical settings and these emergent dynamics can be explored by
examination of these enabling and constraining features.
DIRECT SOCIAL PERCEPTION
One of the concerns that critical readers might raise is whether
direct perception is really possible in activity that is so heav-
ily mediated by cultural processes. How can it be the case that
I directly perceive, say, an insult, given that the host of cul-
tural and historical dependencies on which such an experience is
based? Surely there must be some representation that the cognitive
system must use to keep track of relationships and enable the rich
complexity of even momentary events in social interactions.
This kind of concern makes two mistakes.
First, direct perception is not a claim that what is perceived is
unmediated. Cultural events and actions are mediated by tradi-
tion and practice, but those events can still be directly perceived.
Cognitivist and computationalist models of psychology have per-
haps trained our intuitions to consider that only the world as
described by Physics, in its neutral, raw, brute form can be per-
ceived directly. To perceive culturally mediated phenomena such
as social roles, symbols, and the social implications of actions must
requiremental gymnastics to infer the cultural import of a physical
event.
Direct perception of non-physical (in the “mere” or “brute”
sense of physical) is a perfectly coherent notion and all of ecolog-
ical psychology is grounded in the idea. For ecological psychology
the pickup of ecological information is done through physical
interaction, of course (what else could it be?) but what that
information enables perception of can be anything so long as a
sufﬁciently reliable relationship exists between it and the informa-
tion in question. The glint in my wife’s eye or the rudeness in the
exclusionary orientation of a person’s body, or of the offensive-
ness of their utterances, are perceived within the interaction, not
built, LEGO-style, from the perception of their elements. They
depend on my ability to engage effectively with social practices
and in the individual people in question, but as I have noted those
abilities are culturally shaped from the ground up. My move-
ments and utterances are culturally structured, meaningful at
their most basic level; cultural relevance and value is not added
afterward.
Second, direct perception is not instantaneous (Bingham,
1995). It is un-mediated by inference or representations, but it
can still take time, sometimes quite a long time. Because of the
dynamic nature of the relationship at least some time (even if it’s a
very very short period of time) will be required to allow the agent
to coordinate their behavior. However, where the dynamics of
the environment are slower, then the process of perceiving might
take relatively prolonged periods. It can take time to see another
person’s intentions and different periods of time might make dif-
ferent aspects of the other person perceivable. Over increasingly
long durations we may see only the contours of the other’s inten-
tions, then their general thrust and tone, and ﬁnally their ﬁner
grains. Direct perception can be slow, and what is perceived can
be vague. There is also no particular moment in time at which
perceiving is “complete” because such perception always occurs
in the ﬂow of on-going behavior – activity does not have to wait
for it.
For more cognitivist thinkers any prolonged coordination will
imply the existence of a representation capable of being updated
so that the agent can keep track of details as they become appar-
ent. This mode of thought, however, makes the assumption that
at any given time the agent’s interactions with the environment
are being built up from bare physical facts that need interpreta-
tion, and are overlooking the possibility of an on-going process
of activity whose trajectory is amended as it is perturbed or oth-
erwise constrained by the way in which it is coupled with the
environment.
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Historical dependency of processes is something that is inher-
ent in a great many forms of dynamical system, with no need
for representations to keep track of that history. Social rela-
tionships between agents are particularly sensitive to historical
dependencies.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Dewey (1896) argued that no behavior occurred outside of the
context of the animal’s already on-going stream of activity. Per-
ceiving and acting exist in a dynamic of tensions and coordinations
that enable the continuity of a person’s effective coping in the
world. The “parts” of psychological activity emerge out of the
“whole” of a living being’s engagement with its environment, not
the other way around.
Enactive and ecological approaches to cognitive science devel-
oped independently, but effectively extend and ﬂesh out Dewey’s
insight. In doing so, they highlight the need for a characterisation
of both the embodied psychological agent, and the environment,
in terms that acknowledge their interdependent relationship. I
have argued in the present paper that bringing enactive and eco-
logical points of view together offers the best hope for such an
account, over either perspective alone [and in this I offer an initial
response to a call for their closer alignment by Chemero (2009)].
The “already acting” point of view that this account involves
means that the environment is never encountered ahistorically. All
acting and perceiving is done in a ﬂow of activity that is continu-
ous for living beings. For us human beings the ﬁelds of action, the
engagements in which we ﬁnd ourselves, have both personal and
cultural histories. Our subjectivity is dependent on our intersub-
jectivity. Social activity mediates individual psychology but does
so in a manner that is fundamental, not additional. Cultural activ-
ity does not sit on top of more basic forms of behavior. Rather,
it evokes, shapes and transforms those basic actions. The envi-
ronment in which we human beings live and act is cultural to its
core.
The approach advocated here poses some challenges for empir-
ical investigation, but can also draw effectively on established
theoretical resources, particularly in the form of the theory of
behavior settings of Barker (1968) and Schoggen (1989). As we
look to the horizon of a more culturally sensitive embodied cog-
nitive science it might also be possible to begin a process of
integration with some aspects of cultural psychology (Bruner,
1990; Harré, 1998; Benson, 2000; Harré and Moghaddam, 2012)
where the primacy of cultural practice in psychological activity is
already acknowledged.
By these lights, a science of radically embodied intersubjectivity
is not only possible, it is the only way in which we can adequately
address the question of the nature of the human mind.
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